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THE IMPACT OF MOBILE

UPON STATE REGULATION OF UTILITIES
By Ross L.

MALONE*

The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in United
Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp. and Federal Power
Commission,' delivered by the Court on February 27. 1956, opened a
Pandora's box, the full effect of which may not yet be apparent. In
the light of subsequent developments, perhaps the impact of the decision can best be described as a chain reaction, the explosive force
of which is far from spent two years later. One outgro.wth of the Mobile
decision was recently characterized by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit as "another battle in the ceaseless struggle waged now
'2
for five years and on almost as many fronts."

The basic question decided by Mobile was a simple one. It was
whether a rate fixed by contract between a gas pipeline and its purchaser could be changed unilaterally by the act of the utility in filing a
new rate schedule with the Federal Power Commission, under the provisions of the Natural Gas Act,3 which ostensibly permit a change of
rates in this manner.
The question arose out of the following facts: In 1946 the Ideal
Cement Company planned, if it could obtain an assured supply of gas
at a sufficiently low rate, to build a plant in Mobile. Before Mobile Gas
*LL.B. 1932, Washington and Lee University. Member of firm of Atwood &Malone, Roswell, N.M., 1937-date. Nominee, President, American Bar Association,
1958-59. Deputy Attorney General of the United States, 1952-53. Member, Task
Force on Legal Services and Procedures of Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, 1954-55. Member, New Mexico Board of Bar
Examiners, 1949-date. Member, American Bar Association House of Delegates,
1946-date. Member, American Bar Association Board of Governors, 1951-54. Trustee,
Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1948-date. Member of the New Mexico Bar. Omicron Delta Kappa.
1350 U.S. 332, 1oo L. Ed. 373 (1956).

2United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Tyler Gas Service Co., 247 F.2d 681, 20
P.U.R. 3 d 425 (5 th Cir. 1957).

-Natural Gas Act of 1938, § 4, 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c
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Service, a distributor to domestic and industrial users, concluded an
agreement with Ideal to supply gas for ten years at 12 cents per thousand cubic feet, Mobile obtained a contract with United Gas Pipe Line
to supply the gas for resale to Ideal for ten years at a price of 10.7 cents
per MCF. This contract, after being filed with and approved by the
Federal Power Commission, became a part of United's filed schedules.
In 1953, without the consent of Mobile, United filed with the Federal
Power Commission new schedules, which purported to increase the
rate on gas for resale to Ideal to 14.5 cents per MCF, a figure more in
line with that charged for other gas furnished by Mobile to United.
As a result of the even more recent decision in Memphis Light, Gas
4
and Water Division v. FederalPower Commission, another outgrowth
of Mobile,5 it is estimated that in excess of 240 millions of dollars
in gas rate charges collected by pipeline companies may be subject to
refund. In that event, five affected pipelines would have to refund in
excess of 191 millions of dollars and the refund in the case of one com0
pany alone is estimated to amount to about 75 millions of dollars.
Even though the natural gas industry, of which long-line pipelines are7
a major segment, is now the sixth largest industry in the country,
its ability to survive the effect of such a blow is questionable. It may
be doubted that the Supreme Court envisioned such an outgrowth of its
decision in Mobile. Certainly, the natural gas companies and the Federal Power Commission were taken completely by surprise by this
further extension of the doctrine.
While the Federal Power Commission and pipelines subject to its
jurisdiction have been most affected by Mobile, there can be no doubt
that state agencies and utilities regulated by them likewise will feel
'250 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 26 U.S.L. Week 3227 (U.S. Feb. 3,
1958) (No. 694).
6
The case involved a situation in other respects similar to Mobile, but the contract between the pipeline company and the buyer contained the following provision: "All gas delivered hereunder shall be paid for by Buyer under Seller's Rate
Schedule (here is inserted the appropriate rate schedule designation), or any effective superseding rate schedules, on file with the Federal Power Commission. This
agreement in all respects shall be subject to the applicable provisions of such rate
schedules and to the General Terms and Conditions attached hereto and filed with
the Federal Power Commission which are by reference made a part hereof." The
parties thus had sought to make the normal rate filing procedure of the Natural Gas
Act applicable, by contract, to their transaction. (Emphasis added.) The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied the Mobile doctrine and held
changes attempted under this provision to be ineffective.
Oid., Petition of Federal Power Comm'n for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 28 (Case No. 694, Supreme
Court of the United States, October Term, 1957).
Ud. at 30.
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the impact of the decision. In New Mexico this has already occurred.8 I. THE LAW BEFORE MOBILE
At first blush it might appear surprising that the gas pipeline
companies should have been taken by surprise by this decision of
the Supreme Court, but inquiry as to the state of the law prior to
the decision in Mobile discloses good reason for the confusion which
had existed.
Prior to Mobile, the Supreme Court of the United States had considered the general question of the effect of a unilateral rate filing
by a utility upon an existing contract rate in two cases. Ostensibly
contrary results were reached in the two cases. The first case was before
the Court in the year 1922. In Wichita Railroad& Light Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission of the State of Kansas9 the Court reviewed the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in a
case in which the district court had enjoined the Public Utilities Commission of Kansas from putting in force, on the basis of a unilateral rate
filing, a new rate which would change an existing contract rate. The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and directed dismissal of the bill seeking the injunction. 10 The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court,
holding that the attempted change of the contract rate in this manner
was ineffectual for the reason that under the Kansas statute an express
finding by the commission that the existing rates were unreasonable
was a prerequisite for a valid order changing such a rate. The Court
summarized its decision with the statement: "We rest our decision on
the principle that an express finding of unreasonableness by the Commission was indispensable under the statutes of the State,'- and
quoted at length from the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in
Kaul v. American Independent Telephone Co. 12 The Wichita doctrine,
therefore, was limited to cases in which the state statute affirmatively
required a finding, and hence a hearing, before any rate change could
be made.
The second case to reach the Supreme Court involving the question was Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.13 It
was decided by the Court approximately fifteen years after the Wichita
BPotash Co. of America v. New Mexico Public Serv. Comm'n, 62 N.M. 1, 303
P.2d 908 (1956).
26o U.S. 48, 67 L. Ed. 124 (1922).
'Public Utilities Comm'n of Kansas v. Wichita R. & Light Co., 268 Fed. 37,
P.U.R. 19 1A 714 (1920).
"126o U.S. at 59, 67 L. Ed. at 13o.
"95 Kan. 1, 147 Pac. 113o (1915).
"Boo U.S. lo9, 81 L. Ed. 540 (1937).
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case, upon appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri.
The case was an action by a public utility to recover the difference
between a contract rate, and a higher amount to which the utility
claimed it was entitled under a rate increase effected unilaterally by a
filing with the regulatory commission of Missouri. Obviously, if the
unilaterally filed rate effectively superseded the pre-existing contract
rate, the utility was entitled to recover the additional amount sought
by its action. If, on the other hand, as held in Wichita, the filing of the
new rate was not effectual to abrogate the existing rate because no
hearing had been held and no finding of unreasonableness had been
made by the commission, then the utility should fail in its action.
The trial court in Missouri found in favor of the defendant, insofar
as this aspect of the case was concerned, holding that the rate filing was
ineffective to change the applicable contract service rate. The Su14
preme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court on this question,
holding that the unilateral rate filing by the utility became effective
in accordance with the Act, without the necessity of a prior hearing
or a finding of unreasonableness as to the existing rate. The final
result reached by the Supreme Court of Missouri was obviously at
variance with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Wichita, unless the two cases could be distinguished on the basis of
the statutes of the respective states in which they arose.
The Supreme Court of the United States, which affirmed the Missouri court, must have felt that such a distinction existed. Yet in its
opinion, by Mr. Justice Butler, it neither followed Wichita nor distinguished it. It was merely ignored. This unfortunate fact no doubt
contributed to the uncertainty which existed prior to Mobile and substantially increased the impact of that decision. It is apparent that
the Wichita doctrine was urged in the briefs15 so that the failure of
the Court to either distinguish the case or follow it is difficult to understand. It remained for utility counsel to find their own explanations
for this anomaly during the ensuing twenty-year period, no doubt at
the expense of their clients in some cases.
It is true that the basis of attack on the new rates differed in the
two cases. The attack upon the unilaterally filed rates in the Midland
case was premised upon constitutional grounds. It was asserted that
the challenged construction of the Public Utility Act resulted in an
unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of a contract, as well
as in the taking of property without due process of law. In the Wichita
"4Kansas City Power &Light Co. v. Midland Realty Co., 338 Mo. 1141, 93 S.W.2d
954 (1936).
"5See 81 L. Ed. at 541.
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case it will be recalled the attack was upon the failure to meet the
statutory requirement of a finding of unreasonableness by the regulatory body, and no constitutional question was discussed by the Court.
The challenged rate in Midland had been tested by other affected
consumers on appeal from the decision of the Missouri commission,
and its validity had been upheld by the Supreme Court of Missouri. 16
The Court pointed out in Midland that the Supreme Court of Missouri had held the new rate to constitute a valid exercise of that state's
police power as applied to existing contract rates. Citing the unquestioned power of the legislature of Missouri to have changed the rate by
legislative act, even though fixed by contract, the Supreme Court of
the United States said that the Missouri Act "is to be taken as if it
declared that rates made in accordance with its provisions shall supersede all existing contract rates."' 7 Pointing out that the exercise of
such legislative power need not be conditioned upon any hearing or
finding of fact by the commission, the Court said:
"It [defendant] does not, and reasonably it could not, contend
that immediate exertion by the legislature of the State's power
to prescribe and enforce reasonable and nondiscriminatory
rates depends upon or is conditioned by specific adjudication
in respect of existing contract rates."' s
The Court thus sustained the unilateral action, which resulted
in a change in the existing contract rates without hearing, as a valid
exercise of the state's police power not subject to attack on the constitutional grounds urged.
It has been asserted that the Midland decision is authority only in
jurisdictions in which the enactment of a regulatory act ipso facto
voided all rate contracts as contrary to public policy, and hence that
it would have no application in states which have acts expressly or
impliedly recognizing the existence and validity of contract rates after
enactment of the regulatory act. Certainly that is a possible distinction
insofar as the Natural Gas Act and its construction in Mobile is concerned. As the Court pointed out in Mobile, "The Natural Gas Act,
on the other hand, recognizes the need for private contracts of varying terms and expressly provides for the filing of such contracts as a
part of the rate schedules."'19
If the Midland decision can properly be restricted in its application to states in which no valid contract rate can exist after enactment
"6State ex rel. Case v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 298 Mo. 303, 249 S.W. 955 (1923).
"oo U.S. at 113, 81 L. Ed. at 544.
m03oo US. at 114, 81 L. Ed. at 544.
19350 U.S. at 345, oo L. Ed. at 387.
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of a regulatory act, the question of whether or not a unilateral change
of a contract rate is invalid on constitutional grounds in states not so
holding has not been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The decision in Mobile contributed nothing to the resolution
of this question, "there being no claim that the statute, if interpreted
to permit a natural gas company unilaterally to change its contracts,
20
would be unconstitutional."
Prior to Mobile, state courts and regulatory bodies in states where
the question was of first impression had the alternative of following
Wichita or Midland. If the regulatory act expressly recognized the
existence of valid rate contracts after its enactment, they had a possible
third choice if constitutional questions were raised. The decision in
Mobile, while it offers a new alternative in the unique "review" concept which it expounds, has done nothing to reduce the existing confusion in the field.
II.

POTASH Co. OF AMERICA V. NEw MEXICO PUBLIC SERV. COMM'N

At the time the decision in Mobile was delivered by the Supreme
Court of the United States, there was pending in the Supreme Court
of New Mexico a case involving the change of a contract gas rate
by a new rate filing made by the utility.2 ' It was a case of first impres-

sion. Briefs of the parties had been completed and filed when the
Mobile opinion came down. The application to be given the Mobile
doctrine, of course, became a major issue in the oral argument. The
Court permitted the filing of supplemental briefs after oral argument
as to the applicability of the Mobile decision in New Mexico.
The New Mexico case involved a service contract with a single,
large industrial customer of the utility. It had been in effect for several years, during which time the price of gas had increased to the
point where the utility was experiencing an out-of-pocket loss on the
actual cost to it of purchasing the gas being delivered under its contract. Negotiation between the parties had failed to produce a solution,
and the utility thereupon filed a new rate with the New Mexico
Public Service Commission to be applicable to this customer, accompanied by a sworn petition setting out the factual situation.
In its petition the utility proposed that the New Mexico Public
Service Commission put the new rate into effect at the earliest possible
time, and that a hearing be called immediately to determine the just
*35o U.S. at 337, ioo L. Ed. at 383.
2'Potash Co. of America v. New Mexico Public Serv. Comm'n, 62 N.M. i, 3o3
P.2d 9o8 (1956).
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and reasonable rate applicable to the service in question. Pending
the determination of such a rate, the utility offered to guarantee
by surety bond the repayment to the customer of any amount collected
under the new rate which might be in excess of a just and reasonable
rate as determined by the commission. The New Mexico commission,
acting ex parte upon the verified petition of the utility and supporting
schedules, entered its interlocutory order putting the rate into effect,
calling a hearing upon the rate and requiring the utility to post surety
bonds guaranteeing repayment of any excess which might be collected
22
over the rate ultimately fixed by the commission.
The customer, having unsuccessfully moved before the commission
to dismiss the proceeding, on the ground that its effect had been to
change a contract rate by unilateral action of the utility, and without
a hearing, went into the state district court. It there sought to enjoin the
commission and the utility from giving effect to the newly filed rate
or the commission's order which prohibited the furnishing of gas to
the customer other than at the new rate specified in the rate schedule.
The injunction was sought under the provision of the New Mexico
statute which expressly authorized enjoining the commission or its
members if it should undertake to act "in excess of its jurisdiction
and authority conferred under this act, or without jurisdiction."
The trial court sustained motions to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the administrative remedy afforded to the customer had
not been exhausted inasmuch as the proceeding before the commission had not been concluded. It was the appeal from this action of
the trial court which was pending before the Supreme Court of New
Mexico at the time the Mobile decision was announced by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Needless to say, the gas customer was
overjoyed at the decision and the utility was anything but pleased
with it. The customer urged Mobile as absolute support for its position that the commission had acted in excess of its jurisdiction in permitting the newly filed rate to go into effect without a hearing.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, which
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, did not refer to the opinions
of the Supreme Court in Mobile or Sierra.2 3 The opinion of the single
dissenting justice, however, was predicated almost entirely upon these
-In the Matter of Fixing Just and Reasonable Gas Rates to Apply to Service
Rendered Potash Co. of America Potash Mine and Refinery Near Carlsbad, New
Mexico, Southern Union Gas Co., Petitioner, Case No. 418 on the Docket of the

New Mexico Public Serv. Comm'n.
2FederaI Power Comm'n v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 5o U.S. 348, ioo L. Ed.
388 (1956).
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decisions and, on the basis of them, would have reversed the trial
24
court.
The court's opinion found that the commission, in entering its
interlocutory order, "was moving strictly in conformity with the act
creating it to determine one of the major questions submitted to its
jurisdiction-a question of rates." 25 In the appeal from the final order
of the commission which followed, this statement was cited as authority that the Wichita and Mobile decisions had no applicability in New
Mexico. This was on the premise that if, as contended, a hearing was
a necessary prerequisite for the change of a contract rate, the commission would have been acting in excess of its jurisdiction in putting
this rate into effect. Having held that the commission was acting within its jurisdiction, the court necessarily had concluded that no prior
hearing was required under the New Mexico statute.
The customer urged, with equal vigor, that the decision of the
Supreme Court was authority only for the proposition that the administrative remedy of the customer had not been exhausted before
the commission and that until exhausted the jurisdictional question
could not be raised in a collateral proceeding.
The dissenting justice, after quoting at length from the Mobile
and Sierra opinions, including the statement that a hearing and finding
of unreasonableness was a necessary prerequisite to a valid change of
an existing contract rate, said:
"I agree with this statement, and would have the Court approve
the rule of the Mobile and Sierra cases made under statutory
provisions almost identical with our Public Utility Act, that a
contract rate may not be changed by the utility under a mere
rate-filing procedure, or by the commission in an ex parte order;
but that a contract rate may only be changed, as heretofore indicated, after a hearing and finding a change is required in the
public interest-that neither the filing of a new rate nor an order
of the commission without notice, hearing and the requisite
' 20
findings as to the public interest may change a cbntract rate.
In view of the heavy reliance in the dissenting opinion upon the
Mobile and Siesra opinions, it appears that the majority of the court
concluded that the Mobile doctrine had no application in the construction of the New Mexico statute.
2

'Potash Co. of America v. New Mexico Public Serv. Comm'n, 62 N.M. i,

3o3 P.2d go8, 914 (1956) (dissenting opinion).

2Potash Co. of America v. New Mexico Public Serv. Comm'n, 62 N.M. i, 3o3
P.2d go8, 912 (1956).
mPotash Co. of America v. New Mexico Public Serv. Comm'n, 62 N.M. s,
303 P.2d 9o8, 919 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
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III.

EFFECT OF MOBILE ON STATE LAw

There are a number of factors which undoubtedly will be considered by state courts in determining the applicability of Mobile to
the construction of a state regulatory act. Some of them may have influenced the New Mexico court in its decision. These factors include:
A. The Statutory Scheme.
The construction of the Natural Gas Act by the Supreme Court
relegated it to the status of a review statute, as distinguished from a
rate-making statute. Thus, the Court said:
"In short, the Act provides no 'procedure' either for making
or changing rates; it provides only for notice to the Commission
of the rates established by natural gas companies and for review by the Commission of those rates. The initial rate-making
and rate-changing powers of natural gas companies remain undefined and unaffected by the Act."27
Referring to Sections 4(e) and 5(a) of the Act, relating to hearings
which might be held by the commission upon the filing of a new schedule or upon the complaint of a purchaser, the Court further pointed
out:
"This is neither a 'rate-making' nor a 'rate-changing' procedure.
It is simply the power to review rates and contracts made in the
first instance by natural gas companies and, if they are determined to be unlawful, to remedy them."28
In further support of its conclusion that rates are made by the
natural gas company through unilateral filings, or by contract between
the utility and the customer, and that the function of the commission
is merely to review rates so made, the Court further concluded:
"Section 4 (d) provides not for the filing of 'proposals' but for
notice to the Commission of any 'change... made by' a natural
gas company, and the change is effected, if at all, not by an order
of the Commission but solely by virtue of the natural gas company's own action." 29
Obviously, where it is determined that a state regulatory statute is
merely a review statute, and does not provide a rate-making or ratechanging procedure, the decision in Mobile will be highly persuasive
to state regulatory bodies and state courts considering the applicability
of the Mobile decision.
u35o US. at 343, 1oo L. Ed. at 386.
235o U.S. at 341, ioo L. Ed. at 385.
235o U.S. at 342, 1oo L. Ed. at 385.
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Whether a state regulatory act, such as the New Mexico statute,
can be properly relegated to that category is questionable. The New
Mexico statute,3 0 in its provision for the filing of new rate schedules
by the public utility,31 refers not to the filing of rates theretofore
fixed by the utility, but rather to the filing of a notice which "shall
plainly state the changes proposed to be made in the rates then in
" It requires the utility to give such notice as the commission
force ....
may direct of the "proposed changes" and specifies that all "proposed
changes" shall be shown by filing new schedules, etc. Similar provisions appear in the statutes of many other states.
If the new rate schedule filed by a utility is a "proposal," the proposed rates become existing rates only when they go into effect by
operation of the statutory provisions. The New Mexico Act, typical of
most state acts, provides that such proposed rates shall not go into effect prior to the expiration of thirty days unless the commission shall
order it "for good cause shown." In so ordering the proposed rates
into effect, or in permitting them to go into effect at the end of thirty
days through abstention from exercise of its power to suspend the
rates pending hearing, the commission, through action or inaction, as
the case may be, converts the "proposed rates" into effective rates.
There is, therefore, good grounds to conclude that state acts of the
type of the New Mexico Act are in fact "rate-making" or "rate-changing" procedures and not simply review acts to which the Mobile doctrine would be applicable.
It is a necessary corollary of that proposition that if action, or the
withholding of action by the commission under the statute, has the effect of making the rate effective, it constitutes an exercise of the police
power of the state. As such, it would appear to be valid, as against
attack on constitutional grounds, on the basis discussed by the Supreme Court of Missouri and the Supreme Court of the United
States in their consideration of the Midland case.
B. Scope of the Regulatory Act.
In construing the Natural Gas Act, the Supreme Court recognized
the fact that Congress, in enacting the statute, was dealing with a
situation in which "only a relatively few wholesale transactions are
regulated by the Natural Gas Act."3 2 This is not the case with state
regulatory acts which govern the relationship between utilities and
hundreds of thousands of consumers within the state.
3N.M. Stat. Ann. c. 68, arts. 3-11 (1953).
"N.M.Stat. Ann. § 68-6-7 (1953).
12350 U.S. at 399, 1oo L. Ed. at 384.
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It had been urged upon the Supreme Court in Mobile that Armour
Packing Co. v. United States33 was controlling. That case held that
the Interstate Commerce Act precluded private rate agreements by
carriers, thus giving rate contracts no standing as against subsequently
filed rates. The Court pointed out in Mobile that the Interstate Commerce Act dealt with a "vast number of retail transactions of railroads
[which] made policing of individual transactions administratively
impossible. ' 34 It recognized that where that situation existed, effective
regulation could be accomplished only by requiring compliance with
a single schedule of rates applicable to all shippers. It would appear
that the transactions regulated by the average state utility regulatory
act are far more comparable to the "vast number of retail transactions of railroads" than to the "relatively few wholesale transactions"
regulated by the Natural Gas Act. On that basis, the decision in
Armour Packing Co. might be more persuasive to state courts or commissions than Mobile.
C. The Status of Contracts under the Regulatory Act.
Reference has been made to the contention that the Midland doctrine is applicable only in states in which rate contracts are held to
be void as contrary to public policy after enactment of a utility regulatory statute. On that premise, it is asserted that since the contract
was void, the rate specified by it is in the same category as other noncontract rates of the utility and may be changed unilaterally. The
Missouri decisions do not provide a clear answer to this question.
Certainly it is a pertinent one in determining the applicability of the
Midland decision.
There can be no question as to the validity and effect of rate contracts under the Natural Gas Act. In Mobile the Supreme Court referred to the fact that the Natural Gas Act recognizes "the need for
private contracts of varying terms and expressly provides for the filing
of such contracts as part of the rate schedules." 35
In Midland, on the other hand, the Supreme Court did not expressly premise its decision upon the status of rate contracts in Missouri. It based its opinion on the decision by the Supreme Court of
Missouri that a unilateral change in a contract rate, resulting from a
rate filing by the utility, constituted a valid exercise of the police
power of the state.
U.S. 56, 52 L. Ed. 681 (igo8).
"350 U.S. at 338, 1o L. Ed. at 383.
' 35o U.S. at 345, loo L. Ed. at 387.
3o9
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The Supreme Court relied upon State ex rel. Washington University v. Public Service Comm'n of Missouri3 6 as evidencing this determination by the Missouri court. In that opinion the Supreme Court
of Missouri, referring to existing rate contracts, said:
"These contracts are of no vitality, in so far as they affect rates.
The Public Service Commission, in fixing
rates, cannot be dog87
ged or obstructed by contract rates."
Referring to State ex rel. City of Sedalia v. Public Service Comm'n
of Missouri38 as the case in which this doctrine was originally announced, it said:
"The effect of this and subsequent holdings is that contract
prices count for naught in the fixing of rates by the Public Serv39
ice Commission."
In interpreting these statements it must be borne in mind that
the Missouri statute expressly provided for the filing of rate contracts
in existence at the time of the original enactment of the Missouri
statute. It provided:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent any
telegraph corporation or telephone corporation from continuing to furnish the use of its lines, equipment or service under any
contract or contracts in force at the date this article takes effect
or upon the taking effect of any schedule or schedules of rates
subsequently filed with the Commission, as hereinafter provided,
40
at the rate or rates fixed in such contract or contracts.
This statute was subsequently extended to other utilities. Considering the effect of this provision of the statute, the Supreme Court
of Missouri, in its opinion in the Midland case, said:
"So, in the light of our decisions supra, we have no hesitancy
in reaffirming that the statute purporting to preserve existing
contracts does not operate to exempt such contracts from the
scope of the exercise of the police power of the state to protect
or promote the general or public welfare by regulating rates of
public utilities so as to raise or lower, as the case may be, previously existing contract rates. We are of the opinion that the
commission's findings and order expressly made are in legal
effect, since there was no substantial evidence to the contrary,
163o8 Mo. 328, 272 S.W. 971 (1925).
reState ex rel. Washington University v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Missouri, 3o8
Mo. 328, 272 S.W. 971, 972 (1925).
-275 Mo. 201, 204 S.W. 497 (1918).

3State ex rel. Washington University v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Missouri,
308 Mo. 328, 272 S.W. 971, 972 (1925).
10Mo. Rev. Stat. § 5189 (1929).
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decisive that said contract rate was unreasonable, and that said
rate schedule in question superseded
the contract rate and ren4
dered the latter nugatory." 1
The latter part of this quotation hardly seems consistent with the
contract rate having been nullified by enactment of the Missouri regulatory act. As the court stated, it was the "rate schedule" which "superseded the contract rate and rendered the latter nugatory." Presumably,
until filing of the rate schedule, the contract remained in effect and
the rate fixed by it was binding. On that basis it would seem that
when the court in the Washington University case said, "These contracts are of no vitality, in so far as they affect rates," 42 it was saying
that as against a valid exercise of the police power contract rates
"count for naught," and are in the same category as noncontract rates.
As stated at the outset, the Missouri decisions on this question do
not clearly resolve the question. The Washington University case is
certainly subject to the construction that rate contracts have "no
vitality." If that view be accepted, the doctrine of Midland is circumscribed and limited to jurisdictions in which, after enactment of the
regulatory acts, rate contracts are invalid and unenforceable. States
considering the Mobile question for the first time undoubtedly will
give careful consideration to the law of the state as regards status of
rate contracts. In many cases their final conclusion may be determined
by their decision on this question of the effect of the act upon rate
contracts.
D. The Limitations Inherent in the Mobile Opinion.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court in
Mobile, summarily dismissed the numerous state decisions construing
state regulatory acts in existence prior to Mobile with the statement:
"The parties have also referred us to numerous state court decisions construing state statutes of varying degrees of similarity
to the Natural Gas Act, some holding that unilateral contract
changes were authorized and others holding that they were not.
Taken as a whole, the State decisions prove little more than that
the question is an open one and afford little guidance to the
43
proper interpretation of the Federal Act."

It is interesting to note that in support of the statement that some
"1Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Midland Realty Co., 338 Mo. 1141, 93
S.W.2d 954, 959 (1936).
2
State ex rel. Washington University v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Missouri, 3o8
Mo. 328, 272 S.W. 971, 972 (1925).
'335o U.S. at 346-47, ioo L. Ed. at 388. (Emphasis added.)
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states hold that unilateral rate changes are authorized and others hold
that they are not, the Supreme Court cited cases from four jurisdictions
holding each way. These citations are not exhaustive of the state decisions on the subject. A more comprehensive list of state decisions,
44
generally classified as to result, is appended in the footnote.
If it be true that the state decisions "afford little guidance to the
"Decisions holding that a contract rate can be changed only after hearing
and order of the regulatory body: Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n of the State of Kansas, 260 U.S. 48, 67 L. Ed. 124 (1922); Allen W.
Hinkel Dry Goods Co. v. Wichison Industrial Gas Co., 64 F.2d 881 (loth Cir. 1933);
Attleboro Steam & Electric Co. v. Narragansett Electric Lighting Co., 295 Fed.
895 (D. R.I. 1924); Birmingham Electric Co. v. Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n, 233
Ala. 675, 173 So. 19 (1937), and see Alabama Water Co. v. City of Attalla, 211
Ala. 3os, 100 So. 490 (1924); New Haven v. New Haven Water Co., 132 Conn. 496,
45 A.2d 831 (1946); Smith v. Delaware Coach Co., 31 Del. Ch. 256, 70 A.2d 257
(1949); Jefferson Deposit Co. v. Central Illinois Light Co. of Peoria, 309 I1. 262,
14o N.E. 817 (1923); Winfield v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Indiana, 187 Ind. 53, x18
N.E. 531 (1918); Kaul v. American Independent Telephone Co., 95 Kan. 1, 147 Pac.
1130 (1915); Inhabitants of North Berwick v. North Berwick Water Co., 125 Me.
446, 134 Atl. 569 (1926); In re Caribou Water, Light & Power Co., 121 Me. 426, 117
Ad. 579 (1922); In re Searsport Water Co., 118 Me. 382, io8 Atl. 452 (1919); Great
Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 88 Mont. 18o, 293 Pac. 294 (1930);
State ex rel. Hughes v. Milhollan, 50 N.D. 184, 195 N.W. 292 (1923); City Comm'n
of Bismarck v. Bismarck Water Supply Co., 47 N.D. 179, 181 N.W. 596 (19i2); Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah, io5 Utah
266, 145 P.2d 790 (1944); Rutland Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Burditt Bros., 94 Vt. 421,
111 At. 582 (1920); Commonwealth ex rel. Page Milling Co. v. Shenandoah River
Light & Power Corp., 135 Va. 47, 115 S.E. 695 (1923); Re Wisconsin-Michigan Power
Co., 17 P.U.R. (N.s.) 295 (Mich.); Caple v. Interstate Util. Co., P.U.R. 193oA 18
(Idaho).
Decisions holding that a contract rate may be changed by unilateral action of
the utility in filing new rate schedules: Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power &
Light Co., 300 U.S. log, 81 L. Ed. 540 (1937); United States v. Arkansas Power &
Light Co., 165 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1948); City of Paragould v. Arkansas Light &
Power Co., 171 Ark. 86, 284 S.W. 529 (1926); Harrison Electric Co. v. Citizens'
Ice & Storage Co., 149 Ark. 502, 232 S.W. 932 (1921); State ex rel. City of Sedalia v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of Missouri, 275 Mo. 0oi, 204 S.W. 497 (1918); New Jersey Suburban Water Co. v. Town of Harrison, i2o N.J.L. 546, 1 A.2d 61 (1938), rev'd on
other grounds 122 N.J.L. i89, 3 A.2d 623 (1939); In re Dry Dock, East Broadway 8:
Battery R. Co., 254 N.Y. 305, 172 N.E. 516 (193o); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Pavilion
Natural Gas Co., 232 N.Y. 146, 133 N.E. 427 (1921); Town of North Hempstead v.
Public Serv. Corp. of Long Island, 231 N.Y. 447, 132 N.E. 144 (1921); Pittsburgh v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 178 Pa. Super. 368, 115 A.2d 858 (1955); Duquesne Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 273 Pa. 287, 117 AtI. 63 (1922); Suburban
Water Co. v. Borough of Oakmont, 268 Pa. 243, 15o At. 778 (1920); Leiper v. Baltimore & P. R. Co., 262 Pa. 328, 1o5 Atl. 551 (1918); North Coast Power Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 114 Wash. 102, 194 Pac. 587 (1921); State ex rel. Ellertsen v.
Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. of Spokane, 1o02 Wash. 19G6,
172 Pac. 899 (9ig).
The state law in Colorado is uncertain. Cf. City of Lamar v. Town of Wiley,
80 Colo. 18, 248 Pac. 1oo9 (1926); Ohio & Colorado Smelting & Refining Co. v.
Public Utilities Comm'n of Colorado, 68 Colo. 137, 187 Pac. 1o82 (1920o); Denver
& S. P. Ry. Co. v. City of Englewood, 62 Colo. 229, 161 Pac. 151 (q916).

1958]

REGULATION OF UTILITIES

proper interpretation of the Federal Act," the converse would appear
to be equally true. Certainly this would be true if any marked difference existed between the statutory scheme of the two acts in the respects referred to above. In any event, the language quoted undoubtedly will receive some consideration from a state court or regulatory
body in determining the applicability of the Mobile doctrine in the
construction of a state regulatory act with reference to the modification of contract rates.
E. The ProcedureFollowed Before the Commission.
Conceivably, the procedure followed before the commission in the
increase of a contract rate may have a bearing upon the applicability
of the Mobile doctrine. The New Mexico case heretofore discussed was
instituted before the commission more than a year prior to the decision
in Mobile. While the new rate filed by the utility was made the effective rate on the basis of an ex parte proceeding, without notice to
the customer or hearing upon the old rate, the commission adopted a
procedure which was well adapted to the protection of the rights of all
parties involved. Thus, while the rate was placed in effect immediately,
it was placed in effect under bond guaranteeing repayment of any
amount which might be collected in excess of the rate finally fixed by
the commission upon hearing. The order which put the rate into
effect called a hearing to determine a just and reasonable rate to be
applicable to this single industrial customer. By this device, the commission avoided the administrative lag in rates otherwise incident to
extended administrative hearings. The time which elapsed before
entry of the final order of the commission, some twelve months later,
was extended by the collateral litigation, but the effect of the bond
procedure was to make the rate finally determined by the commission
applicable from the effective date of the original order.
The extent to which this procedure may have insulated the New
Mexico case from Mobile, in which the Federal Power Commission
had no power to suspend because it was dealing with an industrial rate,
cannot be evaluated. Certainly, the procedure followed protected the
rights of all concerned, except to the extent it might be contended
that the customer had a constitutional right to retain his contract
rate until an affirmative finding of unreasonableness had actually been
made by the commission.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Before concluding this necessarily limited discussion, some attempt
to predict the future perhaps is indicated. After seeing Memphis grow
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out of Mobile, however, it is believed that no one would voluntarily
assume this risk.
In states in which the validity of a change of a contract rate by a
rate filing of the utility has not been finally determined, it is most
unlikely that a utility will, in the future, attempt to change a contract rate by unilateral action in the face of the decision in Mobile.
Even though counsel might feel that the Mobile doctrine could be
successfully distinguished by a comparison of the Natural Gas Act with
the state regulatory act, the likelihood is that the utility will pursue
the safe course of invoking a hearing on the old rate before any change
is made.
From the point of view of the regulatory body and the utility,
this safe course may leave a great deal to be desired. The administrative lag in rate changes incident to extended hearings before regulatory bodies, whose dockets are badly congested, is becoming a major
problem.
In the Government's petition in the Memphis case for certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, it was pointed out that the effect of the Memphis decision
would be to limit natural gas companies to the hearing and order
procedure before any contract rate could be changed, absent the purchaser's assent. This would be true regardless of the provision of
the contract with reference to future changes in rate. It was further
pointed out that substantially all rates regulated by the Federal Power
Commission under the National Gas Act are contract rates because
of the necessity for such contracts in obtaining financing for the construction of interstate facilities. At the present time it is not unusual
for a contested rate proceeding before the Federal Power Commission
to continue for two years or more. Extended hearings before state
commissions are becoming more and more common.
Legislative relief may be the ultimate answer to some of the problems growing out of Mobile, but it, of course, must stand the test of
constitutionality. There is no doubt but that the Natural Gas Act,
and state acts which are interpreted to provide a "rate review," can,
by amendment, be converted into "rate-fixing" and "rate-changing"
acts without encountering any constitutional problem. The only potential problem arises in making provision for the operation of "ratechanging" statutes upon contract rates in a manner which will prevent
oppressive administrative lag incident to such changes.
The obvious approach is to follow the trail broken by the decision
in Midland. This does not provide a complete answer, however, be-
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cause of the uncertainty as to whether Midland is premised upon the
invalidity of rate contracts after enactment of the Missouri statute.
Absent that question, a statute patterned after Missouri's, with an
express provision for the handling of a change in a contract rate in
substantially the manner adopted by the New Mexico Commission,
would appear to offer a good possibility.
A statute that authorizes rate contracts, but which expressly makes
rates so agreed upon subject to change in the manner provided by the
act, would clearly be valid as to all contracts entered into after the
effective date of the act. It is the opinion of the author that it also
would constitute a valid exercise of the police power as to contracts
in existence at the time the act becomes effective.
Whether or not legislation results, it is apparent that the chain
reaction set off by Mobile is far from exhausted. There is every indication that the courts and regulatory bodies of both federal and state
governments will be feeling its impact for many years to come.

